The state of Russia’s civilian nuclear power should be cause the entire planet to shudder: Radioactive waste deposal sites are full to the bursting point, and many reactors are outdated and fail to meet even the most basic of safety standards, Eurasian Review says.

The accumulation of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is proportional to the generation of electrical energy. In 2011 there were over 20,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel stored in Russian nuclear power plants and chemical storage sites. Only a tiny fraction of it is processed at special plants. Russia’s stock of spent nuclear fuel accumulates in the highly populated European part of Russia and the total of stored quantities contains nearly 175 tons of plutonium, a substance particularly dangerous because of its harmful affect on the environment.

In fact, the current situation in Russia in terms of radioactive waste is critical. The territory of the Russian Federation is home to nearly half the total amount of atomic waste in the world. Nearly 99 percent of nuclear waste is concentrated in companies run by Rosatom (Nuclear Energy State Corporation), a state-owned company; this waste contains all high-level and a large portion of intermediate-level waste.

All current radioactive waste repositories are almost full to capacity. The remaining storage capacity for solid and liquid radioactive waste will help ensure the operation of civilian nuclear reactors only for another five to eight years. One thing is for sure in Russia: the high amount of spent fuel stored on nuclear plants’ platforms reduces nuclear safety. Unfortunately, however, Russia has no laws on how to handle radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

Also, the unmonitored use of fissile materials continues to be a potential threat. The nuclear energy market is not declining—quite the opposite, it is rapidly growing. This is despite the fact that, for instance, the cost of building a new unit at the Finnish Olkiluoto nuclear plant is $3.9 billion, an amount three, five, even seven times greater than the investment needed to build a power plant that runs on fossil fuels, such as open-cycle gas turbine plants which can be built three or four times faster than a conventional nuclear plant. But are these data taken into account in Russia in light of the fact that the construction of nuclear units has become more and more expensive?

The safety of nuclear reactors is primarily provided through the increased number of sophisticated security systems and physical barriers that limit or contain potential radiation leaks. These systems consist of a combination of natural and artificial barriers that work in tandem and complement each other in assuring the required long-term isolation of the waste by preventing or limiting the movement of radioactive substances from the infrastructure of the repository to the biosphere. However, in essence this has made nuclear plants increasingly more complex systems, which in turn drives up their construction and operation costs, while it is still impossible to achieve a 100 percent safety level. Theories and actual experience on nuclear energy have taught us that there is no absolute guarantee and that some risks will always remain.

Many Russian and foreign specialists are adamantly opposed to extending the designed working life of old nuclear units, such as nuclear units 3 and 4 of the Novovoronezh nuclear plant (Voronezh Oblast, central Russia) and units 1 and 2 of the Kolski nuclear plants (Murmansk region). The Leningrad and Smolensk nuclear plants, located in St. Petersburg and Kursk, respectively and which operate eleven nuclear units, are also too old to be given a new lease on life.

These nuclear plants do not meet modern safety requirements—based on the principle of Russian matryoshka doll—which provides for a system of superimposed barriers to prevent the release of radioactive substances into the atmosphere. Considering that management of nuclear power plants operating on Russian territory follows the rules and safety standards that were applied when first put into service—in some cases a few decades ago—none of these nuclear plants can at present fully meet modern safety requirements. Also, Russia’s dismal record in coping with nuclear accidents means that another Chernobyl-like accident is not a far-fetched scenario.

Massive means and interventions are always necessary in tackling an accident at a nuclear plant. For instance, expenses incurred by countries affected by the Chernobyl disaster to minimize the environmental and social consequences exceeded over $700 billion over a 25-year period, and will be counted into the billions of dollars on an annual basis for many more years. Ukraine is still underwriting about 5 percent of its national budget to deal with the effects of the Chernobyl’s disaster; Belarus close to 10 percent and Russia from 0.5 to 1 percent.

Nuclear power remains the electricity production technology with the lowest production costs. Nuclear renaissance is a worldwide trend: there are now over 60 new nuclear power plants under construction, all based upon different technologies. However, countries benefiting from the nuclear energy produced today must take steps to ensure that the wastes are dealt with responsibly and without unduly burdening future generations. While nuclear energy represents one of the various forms of energy supply, states must continue their research with a view to developing other forms of energy, particularly from renewable sources.

The post-Cold War world has an elusive international structure. Powerful global corporations, as well as international terrorist organizations, can frustrate a search for clarity and efficiency in fighting illicit activities in finance, economy, the organized crime, or smuggling of nuclear material. In Russia, the main culprit is Rosatom. This relic of the Soviet system still operates largely without independent oversight, especially since June 23, 2010, when President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree that stated that Rostekhnadzor (the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision) would be henceforth under the direct control of the government. Rosatom reports to no one in justifying how hundreds of millions of dollars are spent.

In 2002, a Russian scientist, well aware of covert activities by Russian authorities, declared to the Boston Globe that Rosatom is a “super-Mafia.” Secrecy is omnipotent within the governmental organization. A product of the Stalinist era and an embodiment of Cold War-style secrecy, Rosatom is a web of Soviet-era reactors, laboratories and secret “closed cities” where nuclear energy is designed, built, and mass-produced. In 2005, the head of Rosatom, Evgeny Adamov, was arrested in Switzerland after the U.S. State Department complained about the disappearance of $9 million it had earmarked for Russian nuclear security measures. After being convicted in Moscow in 2008, he managed to have the ruling overturned.

Since the signature of the START I treaty in 1991, the U.S. government has spent billions of taxpayer dollars to upgrade nuclear security in Russia. In January 2002, however, a report issued by Russia’s Accounting Chamber brought to light the disappearance of $270 million in U.S. assistance earmarked for cleaning up and building safe storage for the country’s radioactive waste. In this same report, it was revealed that tens of millions of dollars had also been diverted to “research projects” that remain a mystery to this day.

Russia, in many respects, is a “failed nuclear post-Soviet state.” The likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear bomb-making material on the Russian black market is extremely high.