Jamestown Foundation: Putin’s Visit to Baku Stirs up Iran-Russia Tensions on Zangezur Corridor

On August 18–19, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a two-day visit to Azerbaijan (President.az, August 19). This marked the first state visit by a Russian president to the South Caucasian republic and only the second visit in the bilateral relationship since former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev’s trip to Moscow in 2002. Contrary to expectations from local observers, the visit did not yield any significant agreements or binding political and economic arrangements. A few announcements were made regarding future joint initiatives, including cooperation on food security, labor inspections, the establishment of a Russian-Azerbaijani university, and the joint production of oil tankers (News.az, August 19). An agreement was also reached to expand the partnership between Russia’s public joint-stock company (PJSC) Gazprom and the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) . Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller revealed that the two sides agreed to broaden their “multifaceted strategic partnership,” particularly concerning the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) project. He also mentioned the planned signing of a comprehensive scientific and technical cooperation program in September (Report.az, August 19). While few details were disclosed, this marked their first public reference to the INSTC project, about which little is currently known. Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan demonstrates how Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the region, which could lead to neighboring states, such as Iran and Armenia, feeling threatened.

Given the modest nature of the agreements made, many local and international observers interpreted the main motivation of Putin’s visit to be a demonstration that Russia has friends and allies and is not as diplomatically isolated as the West would like to believe.  In that way, Russia’s objectives fit well with Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy strategy, by which Baku continues to avoid being allied with one power center at the expense of the country’s relations with others. The announcement of Azerbaijan’s application to join BRICS—an increasingly loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—one day after Putin’s visit further illustrates this approach, as it provides Baku a forum through which  the country can expand relations with the bloc’s member states (Report.az, August 20).

Russia and Azerbaijan’s relationship with Iran, a BRICS member since the beginning of this year, faced a crisis after Putin’s visit to Baku. This was sparked by comments from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Baku regarding the Zangezur Corridor, a planned transport route linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik Province (see EDM, January 28, September 23, 2022, October 11, 2023). Highlighting the importance of the implementation of the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral statements signed in 2020 and 2021, Lavrov accused Yerevan of “sabotaging the agreement concerning transport routes via Armenia’s Syunik Province, which was signed by [Armenian] Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan” (Azertag, August 20).

Lavrov’s statement caused an uproar in Armenia. Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called it “false, clearly biased, and … disrespectful” (Mfa.am, August 20). In reference to Armenia’s “Crossroads for Peace” project, which was not supported by either Azerbaijan or Türkiye, Armenia called for Russia “to refrain from sabotaging through biased statements neither the project nor the efforts to achieve peace in the South Caucasus” (see EDM, April 15). 

The position of Armenia is clear, given that its leadership has made efforts to distance itself from the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. The agreement calls for the deployment of Russian border guards to the Zangezur Corridor (see EDM, July 9). Armenia has proposed deploying private security personnel along the transportation corridor, though neither Moscow nor Tehran have officially commented on this proposition (Turan.az, September 4). The disagreement over the route has caused clashes between Moscow and Yerevan, as Russia seeks to ensure that Armenia  remains part of the various geopolitical and economic arrangements it established following the 2020 Second Karabakh War. These tensions are expected to grow in the coming months. The deployment of Russia’s border guards to the Zangezur Corridor is seen by the Kremlin as key to maintaining an influential role in the region going forward.

Iran’s reaction was even more surprising. Since Putin’s visit, various Iranian officials and media outlets have continued to criticize Russia’s push to establish the Zangezur Corridor, interpreting it as a geopolitical maneuver that would cut off Iran’s border with Armenia (Tasnim, September 4; 1lurer.am; Iranpress.com, September 7). On August 29, Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that Russia is aware of Iran’s concerns, adding that “Russia believes that the relevant agreements should be implemented with mutual consent and under mutually acceptable conditions. This should be done in a way that serves the interests of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and their neighboring countries: Russia, Iran, and Türkiye” (Arka.am, August 29).

This statement did not appease the Iranian side. On September 3, Russia’s ambassador to Tehran was summoned to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was told that “Tehran is against any change in the internationally recognized borders and geopolitical changes in the region” (Apa.az, September 3). In one of the latest statements by Iranian officials on this topic, Iran’s ambassador to Armenia said, “All dreams and illusions regarding the Zangezur [C]orridor will never become reality,” adding, “We are sure that all control must be fulfilled by the Armenian government, under its sovereignty” (1lurer.am, September 6). “We warn those who pursue such illusions that the consequences of these decisions will be heavy and costly,” threatened Ebrahim Azizi, the head of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee (Iranpress.com, September 7).

Despite Iran’s consistent concerns regarding the Zangezur Corridor, this marks the first instance where its criticism has been explicitly directed at Russia. A key question arises: Why now? Iranian authorities could believe that Russia is preparing to take concrete steps toward realizing this transit route, or the criticism could merely be a manifestation of broader tensions between Moscow and Tehran. Another question relates to the fact that Russia already has border guards deployed along the Armenia-Iran border. Iran may also be concerned by the strengthening of Russia’s military presence in its neighborhood. While the answer to these questions is unclear at this stage, Tehran’s opposition to the deployment of Russia’s border guards to the Zangezur Corridor further complicates the negotiations on the re-opening of the regional transportation routes and is likely to bring about more problems between Moscow and Tehran.