Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem will try to use opportunities offered by Belt and Road Initiative against Armenia – expert opinion

As part of his visit to Tehran on March 27, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi signed a 25-year Strategic Cooperation Agreement with his Iranian counterpart,  Mohammad-Javād Zarīf, after five years of negotiations between his country and the Islamic Republic. For comments on the possible impact of the Chinese-Iranian relations on Armenia, Tert.am has interviewed Mher Sahakyan, a political scientist affiliated with the China-Eurasia Council for Political and Strategic Research, the International Institute for Peace (Austria) and the British Association for Chinese Studies.

Mr. Sahakyan, a 25-year strategic agreement has been signed, potentially promising landmark developments to our region, as different estimates suggest. What do you think is the estimateed significance for the parties? What problems is each party virtually solving for itself?

We are eye witnessing a change in the world order, which sees Russia and China create the Eastern pole. Iran, in its turn, eventually losing hope for any normalization with the West, is clearly taking sides with the Eastern pole by signing the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement. This agreement potentially allows for developing the Chinese-Iranian strategic cooperation. Under conditions of the anti-Iranian sanctions at least, it will be hard to secure new investments in Iran. China, for its part, is securing the use of railway and highway communications passing through Iran’s territory - as part of its own Belt and initiaitve. Taking China under its sponsorship in the Middle East, Iran is trying to balance the ratio of powers between the main actors, preventing the United States from eventually undermining Iran. With this agreement, China and Russia unite their efforts to act jointly in the cyber-security sphere, and it too, is likely to bring about certain changes in the architecture of international security.

The Chinese interests in our region have been very widely discussed. It struck its roots particularly in Iran, with the latest document seemingly promising to resolve several problems - dealing especially with the implementation of economic projects. The development and launch of communications is now, especially under the spotlight. Simultaneously we see other countries’ engagement in similar large-scale projects, i.e.- development of railways and natural gas pipelines, etc. All this seems to be overpassing Armenia. To what extent do you think the programs subject to implementation under the Iran-China document may bear any relationship to us?  

I find the solution to the political, cultural, cyber-security and technical-military components absolutely likely at the current stage. The economic part is not easily feasible due to the sanctions imposed by the US. It has impacted also bilateral trade which, in 2020, plummeted to [$]14 billion instead of the $23 billion in 2019.  The sides are presently considering at least also plans for launching a separate money transfer system to overpass the US-controlled SWIFT and the financial sanctions. Hence it is difficult in the current state of affairs to speak about an Armenia-China-Iran trilateral economic activity that would stem from the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between China and Iran. Armenia has higher chances for developing relations with the sides through bilateral negotiations, as well as the multilateral use of the EAEU-Iran and China-EAEU formats.  

The current Armenian authorities have permanently emphasized - on the level of rhetoric at least – the development of relations with China, hinting the likelihood of Armenia’s engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative. Is any outcome of translating words into action visible as of today?

No outcome at all, but the appointment of a new Chinese ambassador in Yerevan offers at least an opportunity for an upgrade.

China, knowingly, is seeking to increase its influence in different regions. If we imagine, for a moment, that there such an interest in Armenia too, what advantages would that offer to us? Are we expected to benefit from that or are we likely to lose more?

China treats Armenia and Azerbaijan as a zone of Russian interest, permanently making specifications with Moscow in most of the cases. As a matter of fact, Armenia should be the first to pursue a clear-cut strategy for developing its relations with China. But that doesn’t exist. This vision should be developed, first of all, with the understanding that China is a superpower; its factor is expected to grow increasingly in international affairs. So it is important to make also Yerevan’s voice heard in Beijing. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey are developing their relations with Beijing, strengthening the role of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. There is a real threat that the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem will try to use the opportunities offered by the Belt and Road Initiative against Armenia. Hence it is necessary for Armenia to redefine its own relations with Beijing, create a strategic roadmap and use the expertise and connections of skilled human resources to exit this swamp in the Armenia-China relations.